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ABSTRACT
The Spanish Law 30/1995 concerning civil liability in motor vehicle accidents (MVA) has
included, under the precept of moral damage, the compensation of victims of psychological
injury. The literature has identified PTSD and the indirect measurements or secondary disorders
i.e., depression and dystimia, as psychological injury of an MVA. Nevertheless, under civil law,
the diagnosis of PTSD alone does not constitute sufficient evidence given that in legal terms
faking or false testimony must be detected and eliminated before an expert testimony can be
admissible. In this context, and in order to assess the ability of malingerers to fake psychological
injury in MVA, a total of 105 naïve participants i.e., untrained in psychopathology, and who
had never been involved in a traffic accident in which they had sustained physical or
psychological injury, were asked to feign they had suffered psychological injury as a
consequence of a MVA. One week after self-training, they were evaluated on the MMPI-2. The
results show that participants were able to fake both the direct and indirect symptoms of
psychological injury of an MVA. The assessment of the predictive capacity of the validity and
configurations scales of the MMPI-2 for effective simulators of moral damages revealed a wide
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margin of error: 26 subjects (24.76%) were perfect simulators. Finally, the results for the
assessment of psychological injury of MVA are discussed and guidelines are recommended for
detecting faking.
Key words: Faking, motor traffic accidents (MVA), psychologychal assessment, post
traumatic stress disorder (PSTD), MMPI-2.
RESUMEN
La ley española 30/1995 referente a responsabilidad civil en los accidentes de vehículo de
motor (MVA) ha incluido, bajo precepto del daño moral, la remuneración de víctimas de lesión
psicológica. La literatura ha identificado PTSD y las medidas indirectas o desórdenes secun-
darios, ejemplo depresión y distimia, como las lesiones psicológicas de un MVA. Sin embargo,
bajo la ley civil, el diagnóstico de PTSD por sí solo no constituye evidencia suficiente, dado que
en términos legales antes que sea admisible el testimonio de un experto, se deben detectar y
eliminar la falsificación o falso testimonio. En este contexto y para determinar la capacidad de
las personas de falsificar una lesión psicológica en MVA, a un total de  105 participantes quienes
no tenían entrenamiento en psicopatología y nunca habían estado implicados en un accidente
de tráfico en el cual hubiesen sufrido lesión física o psicológica, se les pidió fingir que habían
sufrido una lesión psicológica como consecuencia de un n MVA. Una semana después del auto-
entrenamiento, fueron evaluados con el MMPI-2. Los resultados muestran que los participantes
pudieron falsificar tanto  los síntomas directos como los indirectos de  lesión psicológica de un
MVA. La evaluación de  la capacidad predictiva de las escalas de  validez y de las
configuraciones del MMPI-2 para los simuladores efectivos de daños morales, reveló un amplio
margen de  error: 26 sujetos  (24.76%) fueron simuladores perfectos. Finalmente, se discuten
las implicaciones de los resultados para la evaluación de lesiones psicológicas en MVA y se
recomiendan pautas para detectar la falsificación.
Palabras clave: Falso testimonio, evaluación psicológica,  accidentes de trafico con
vehículo de motor (MVA), desorden de estrés post-traumático (PSTD), MMPI-2.
INTRODUCTION
The Spanish Law 30/1995, 8 November 1995
regulating Civil Responsibility and Motor
Insurance has introduced for the first time in
Spain psychological injury as an item to be
estimated under the category of moral injury.
Whilst physical injury is estimated on
compensation tables, the estimation for
compensation of psychological injury sustained
in a motor vehicle accident have not been clearly
established due to the difficulties in estimating
claims in monetary gains (Douglas, Huss,
Murdoch, Washington, & Korch, 1999; Koch,
Douglas, Nicholls, & O’Neill, 2006; Santos,
1989). According to Spanish Law 30/1995,
psychological injury is defined as injury sustained
as a result of having undergone a traumatic
experience which, to a greater or lesser degree,
may adversely affect a person’s everyday life in
terms of family relationships, social relationships,
work, and/or leisure (Iglesias, 1996). Though
legislators had been well aware of the
psychological injuries sustained in Motor Vehicle
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Accidents (MVAs), they had often been reticent
to consider them as an element to be evaluated in
claims for victims compensation on the basis of
the difficulties in assessing psychological inju-
ries and hence the creation of objective
compensation tables (American Medical
Association, 1995; Criado del Río, 1999; Muller,
1995; Pérez & García, 1991) primarily due to the
subjective, individual and personal nature of
psychological injuries (Kane, 2006; Koch, et al.,
2006). As these deficiencies have now been
overcome, the Spanish law has recently
introduced psychological injury as an item for
victim compensation. Thus, Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and its indirect
measurements i.e., comorbidity with disorders
such as hypochondriasis, hysteria, depression,
anxiety, dystimia (Blanchard & Hickling, 2004;
Bryant & Harvey, 1995; Fuglsang, Moergeli, &
Schnyder, 2004; Kessler, Sonnega, Hughes, &
Nelson, 1995; Maes, Mylle, Delmiere, &
Altamura, 2000; O’Donnell, Creamer, & Pattison,
2004; Stallard, Salter, & Velleman, 2004; Taylor
& Koch, 1995; Vallejo-Pareja, 1998) have been
admitted as evidence of psychological injury
given that it has been systematically observed
that this disorder is linked to having experienced,
directly or indirectly, traumatic events such as
sexual aggression (p. ej., Echeburúa, Corral,
Zubizarreta, & Sarasúa, 1995; Naugle, Bell, &
Polusny, 2003), natural disasters (p. ej.,
Hodgkinson, Joseph, Yule, & Williams, 1995),
war (p. ej. Fairbank, Ebert, & Zarkin, 1999),
kidnapping, torture or accidents (p.ej.,
Blanchard, Hickling, Taylor, & Loos, 1996).
Furthermore, reliable and valid measurement
instruments, i.e., the Structured Interview of
Reported Symptoms or the MMPI, have been
designed to measure and provide an objective
quantification (p. ej., V axis of the DSM-IV-TR)
of psychological injury (Rogers, 1997a).
However, PTSD has been identified as a primary
diagnostic in those who have suffered a traumatic
event, the secondary diagnostics vary from one
traumatic event to other. Thus, in cases of sexual
assault the secondary disorders are normally
depression, social inadaptability and sexual
dysfunctions whereas in traffic accidents the
literature has identified depression, dystimia,
anxiety, phobias and substance or alcohol abu-
se/dependence (Blanchard & Hickling, 2004;
Bryant & Harvey, 1995; O’Donnell, Creamer, &
Pattison, 2004; Fuglsang, Moergeli, & Schnyder,
2004; Maes, Mylle, Delmiere, & Altamura, 2000;
Stallard, Salter, & Velleman, 2004; Taylor &
Koch, 1995).
Within the context of motor vehicle accidents,
the focus of medical-legal assessment can no
longer be restricted to the traditional role of
diagnosing disorders and must encompass the
detection of feigning (American Psychiatric
Association, 2002). To achieve both objectives,
the design of effective clinical procedures for the
diagnosis and control of feigning is indispensa-
ble particularly in view of the fact that standard
clinical evaluation has never been able to detect
feigning (e.g. Rogers, 1997b).
Thus the aim of this experimental study was
twofold: a) to evaluate on the MMPI-2, the
standard instrument for evaluating psychological
injury in a forensic context (Butcher & Miller,
1999), the person’s ability to feign psychological
injury sustained in a MVA; and b) to assess the
efficacy of the validity scales and the
configurations of the validity scales to predict
the faking of psychological injury.
METHOD
Subjects
A total of 105 naïve participants in
psychopathology, and who had never been
involved in a traffic accident in which they had
sustained physical or psychological injury, 45
men (42.86%) and 66 women (57.14%), over the
age of 18 years, with an 19 to 75 year age range
distribution, with the mean age biased to young
people in line with the proportion of real victims
of traffic accidents (M= 24.12; SD= 7.07), took
part in the study. The participants were 74
employed, 22 self-employed, 4 unemployed, 1
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retired person, and 4 participants of no fixed
profession. As for the academic level, all
participants had at least the certificate of
secondary education, that is, all had a minimum
of cognitive skills to malinger (prior to
participating in the study, all participants were
interviewed in order to detect brain damage or
deficiencies in cognitive skills).
Measurement Instruments
Measurements were carried out using the
MMPI-2 measurement instrument adapted for
the Spanish context by the TEA (Hathaway &
McKinley, 1999), which is the most frequently
used instrument for the forensic evaluation of
psychological injury (Butcher & Miller, 1999).
In order to clinically measure direct and indirect
psychological injury sustained in motor vehicle
accidents, the basic clinical scales of the MMPI-
2 were used as well as the two additional
measurement scales of the PTSD, the Pk and Ps
Scales. For feigning, the original validity scales
(“no answers”, L, F, and K scales), and the
complementary validity indicators (Back F, TRIN
and VRIN) were used, (other validity scales such
as the Fp and the Ds scales were not used as they
are not currently part of the MMPI-2 scoring).
Moreover, the results obtained from the original
MMPI-2 validity scales were used to calculate
the configurations that have proven to be effective
for the detection of feigning of disorders
(Duckworth & Anderson, 1995). The F-K index,
also known as the “Gough index” and the
“inverted V” profile have proven to be robust
indicators of attempts to portray a bad image
whereas the “inverted V” profile detects the
exaggeration of symptoms (Nicholson et al.,
1997).
Procedure
Participants were asked to complete the
adapted Spanish version of the MMPI-2 (Hataway
& McKinley, 1999) following the standard
instructions outlined in the MMPI-2 for
contrasting the participant’s mental condition.
All participants freely consented to participate in
the experiment, and were informed that they
would undergo clinical evaluation and would be
provided a report on their clinical condition on
request. The questionnaires were administered
individually. Having completed the MMPI-2,
participants were instructed they would be re-
evaluated one-week later. The second evaluation
involved supplying participants a series of feigning
instructions whereby they had to imagine they
had been injured in a traffic accident and were
feigning to have suffered psychological injuries
so as to obtain a sizeable compensation for
damages. Prior to being re-evaluated on the
MMPI-2, participants were given some time to
rehearse for the feigning task. To maximize
participant commitment to the task at hand, a
financial incentive of 150 Euros was offered to
the four best feigners of psychological injury.
RESULTS
Evaluation of feigning on the MMPI clinical
scales
In order to assess the first objective of the
present study i.e., to determine the ability to
feign psychological injury, the responses of the
feigning condition were contrasted with the cut-
off point (70 being the most common score)
beyond which the “diagnostic impression” that
the subject is deemed pathological (Hathaway &
McKinley, 1999). The results (see Table 1) reveal
that the participants matched or significantly
surpassed the cut-off point of the basic clinical
scales for hypochondria, depression, hysteria,
deviation psychopathic, paranoia, psychasthenia,
schizophrenia, and social introversion. The data
show that the subjects who feigned psychological
injury exhibited symptoms of psychological
injury both in terms of primary disorders, the PS
and PK Scales for Posttraumatic Stress Disorders
as well as secondary disorders i.e., depression
(verbigratia, Kessler, Sonnega, Hughes, &
Nelson, 1995; Maes et al., 2000; O’Donnell,
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Creamer, & Pattison, 2004). Nevertheless, the
same results detected psychological injury in
terms of hypochondria, hysteria, psychopathic
deviations, the psychotic triad (paranoia,
schizophrenia and psychasthenia), and social
introversion which are not a psychological
disorder associated to traffic accidents (i.e.,
Blanchard & Hickling, 2004; Fulsang, Moergeli,
& Schnyder, 2004; Stallard, Salter, & Velleman,
2004). Finally, participants in the feigning
condition exhibited neither gender disorders
(masculinity-femininity), nor hypomania.
Analysis of the responses mediated by the
feigning instructions factor
Though the findings support that participants
were able to feign effectively psychological injury
in terms of primary and secondary disorders
associated to traffic accidents should not obscure
the fact that these were associated with unrelated
symptoms. It is worth noting that these results
cannot reject the possibility that the effects were
already present prior to the measurement of
feigning. Thus a repeated measurement design to
evaluate the effects of the instructions on the
clinical measurements was undertaken. The results
reveal a multivariate effect modulated by the
“instructions” factor (standard instructions vs.
feigning instructions), F
multivariate (10,95)= 42.69;
p<.001; eta²= .818. Moreover, explained variance
is such that the “instructions” factor accounts for
82% of the variance.
The univariate effects (see Table 2), show that
participants scored higher towards pathology in
all of the clinical measurements under the “feigning
instructions” condition in comparison to the “stan-
dard instructions” condition. Indeed, in the later
condition, participants reported clinical normality
(i.e., Ms were approximately 50). Likewise, the
analysis of cases rejects the pathology of subjects
in the “standard instructions” condition.
TABLE 1
One sample T-test. Feigning answers.
Variable t p M SD
Hypochondriasis 6.80 .000 80.23 15.42
Depression 7.68 .000 79.09 12.12
Hysteria 5.47 .000 76.75 12.66
Psychopathic deviation -1.70 .093 68.01 12.03
Masculinity-femininity -18.84 .000 52.81 9.35
Paranoia 2.81 .006 74.61 16.84
Psychasthenia 4.95 .000 75.65 11.70
Schizophrenia 7.42 .000 83.10 18.09
Hypomania -8.73 .000 59.71 12.07
Social introversion -1.08 .281 68.63 12.98
PTSD, PK Scale 4.33 .000 75.01 11.87
PTSD PS Scale 4.40 .000 74.85 11.28
Note: df (104). test value= 70.
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As for the direct measurements of PTSD, a
significant increase in the Pk and Ps Scales (see
Table 3) mediated by the instructions factor was
observed. Thus, there was no evidence of PTSD
in the standard instructions condition (M= 49.98
y 49.61 for PK and PS, respectively), whereas in
the feigning instructions condition not only
significant higher scores were obtained but also
the “diagnostic impression” entered the region
of pathology (Ms T scores =70) were obtained
for the measurements of this disorder which
were in the pathology region (T score =70, see
Table 1). Similarly, case analysis showed no
evidence of PTSD under the “standard
instructions” condition while as evidence of
effective feigning (PTSD and depression) was
observed in 60.9% of the cases in the “feigning
instructions” condition, ÷²(1,n=105)=5.03;
p<.05. Thus, it appears that the feigning of
psychological injury in a recognition task such
as the MMPI is quite feasible for potential
feigners.
In short, participants employed a general
feigning strategy consisting of reporting they
suffered from most of the symptoms, that is,
“indiscriminate symptom endorsement”, which
included the direct (PTSD) and indirect
(depression) measurements of psychological
injury associated to a MVA.
TABLE 2
Univariate effects on the clinical scales of the MMPI-2 by the “instructions” factor.
Within-subjects effects
Clinical Scales MS F p Eta² Msi Mmi 1-B
Hypochondriasis 48184.58 303.58 .000 .74 49.93 80.23 1
Depression 46622.10 308.43 .000 .75 49.28 79.09 1
Hysteria 36221.73 330.26 .000 .76 50.49 76.75 1
Psychopathic deviation 12404.74 119.75 .000 .53 52.64 68.01 1
Masculinity-femininity 376.00 8.04 .005 .07 50.13 52.81 .802
Paranoia 34560.17 291.79 .000 .74 49.99 75.65 1
Psychasthenia 32091.50 196.17 .000 .65 49.88 74.61 1
Schizophrenia 59068.97 287.43 .000 .73 49.56 83.10 1
Hypomania 3108.88 39.74 .000 .28 52.02 59.71 1
Social introversion 20562.30 158.61 .000 .60 48.84 68.63 1
Note: df (1,104). M
si= Mean of standard instructions. Mmi= Mean of malingering instructions.
TABLE 3
Within-subjects effects on the PTSD scales by the “instructions” factor.
PTSD Scales MS F p Eta2 Msi Mmi 1-B
PTSD, PK Scale 32887.54 307.76 .000 .747 49.98 75.01 1.000
PTSD, PS Scale 33440.48 318.41 .000 .754 49.61 74.85 1.000
Note: df (1,104). M
si= Mean of standard instructions. Mmi= Mean of malingering instructions.
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Analysis of feigning on the MMPI-2 validity
scales.
Analysis of the sensitivity of the original
MMPI-2 validity scales mediated by the
instructions factor.
The multivariate contrastive analysis revealed
that the response validity control scales were
sensitive to the instructions factor (standard
instructions vs. feigning instructions), F
multivariate
(4,101) =35.63; p< 0.001; eta2= .577. In addition
to the significance of this effect, this factor
explained nearly 60% of the variance.
The univariate analyses (see Table 4) show,
in comparison to the standard instructions
condition, a significant increase in the F Scale
values (Frequency), a decrease in the K Scale (K
Factor), and a fall in the no-answers Scale in the
feigning instructions condition, whereas the L
Scale (Lie) remained unchanged. These findings
are in line with the predictions of the model in the
F and K scales but run counter to the predictions
for feigning on the no-answers Scale.
TABLE 4
Univariate effects in the MMPI-2 original control scales mediated by the “instructions” factor.
Within-subjects effects.
Original control Scales MS F p eta² Msi Mmi 1-B
No answer scale (?) 43.886 10.51 .002 .092 1.91 .99 .895
Lie scale (L) 1029.64 1.28 .260  .012 48.81 53.24 .202
Frequency scale (F) 53536.23 132.88 .000 .561 49.19 81.12 1
K Factor 2558.97 49.60 .000 .323 50.24 43.26 1
Note: df (1,104). M
si= Mean of standard instructions. Mmi= Mean of malingering instructions.
Analysis of the statistical power and the
classification of the original validity scales
under the feigning instructions.
On the basis of the previous findings which
open a door to the possibility of using these
scales for feigning detection in MVA, the
statistical power and the directionality of the
sensitivity to feigning as well as the robustness
of the classification of the cases was assessed
using the design of n=1 in line with standard
forensic procedure.
The criminological model for the explanation
of feigning is based on the basic assumption that
a key strategy of feigners is non-response and
non-cooperation during the evaluation process
(Lewis & Saarni, 1993; American Psychiatric
Association, 2002). On the MMPI, both are
measured by the “no-answer” Scale whose cut-
off point for invalidating a protocol is more than
10 omitted items (Graham, 2006). Our results
revealed that this indicator failed to detect any of
the feigners. Moreover, the contrast between the
means for the standard and the feigning
instructions (see Table 4) highlights that, contrary
to expectation, a low no-answers score was
found in the feigning condition. Thus, the “no-
answer” Scale is not valid for predicting feigning.
The L validity Scale, which is driven to measure
social desirability (by hiding symptoms) but not
feigning, informs of dissimulation if a subject
scores high (T score =70) (Graham, 2006). Clearly,
this strategy is contrary to the interests of feigners
so they should, but do not, score, (M= 53.23; SD=
38.58), in this direction as illustrated by our
results on feigning instructions, t(104)=-22.137;
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p<.001. Nevertheless, the study of cases shows
that the response of 4 participants was in line
with social desirability, that is, dissimulators.
The comparison of the mean of the F Scale
for the feigning instructions (M= 81.12; SD=
26.97) with the cut-off which is indicative of
feigning (T score >70, 7 in raw scores) (Hathaway
& McKinley, 1999), confirms that this is a reliable
indicator of feigning, t(104)=4.226; p<.001.
Nonetheless, the analysis of cases highlights that
only 59.05 % of malingerers (62 participants)
were correctly classified by this scale as a feigner;
thus, it is not a better indicator of feigning than
random prediction, that is, 50%, χ²(1)=3.44; ns.
In short, the F validity Scale is a statistically
reliable indicator of feigning but lacks robustness
in the classification of cases.
The K Scale (M= 43.26; SD= 8.86), which is
efficient for detecting feigners (T score <50) and
dissimulators (T score >65) (Graham, 2006),
was found to be a robust indicator of feigning,
t(104)=7.8; p<.001. In addition, the analysis of
cases showed the correct classification of 78.1%
feigners, which confirms that it is a reliable
feigning indicator, χ²(1)=33.15; p<.001. It is
worth noting, however, that 22.2% of feigners
were not correctly classified as such by this
instrument, which is greater than the statistically
acceptable margin of error, that is, the criteria of
statistical significance (<.05), Z(105)=8.09;
p<.001. Thus, this index allows for a margin of
error greater than is statistically admissible. Thus,
the K Scale is powerful for detecting feigners but
with a considerable margin of error. In addition,
the analysis of cases revealed that none of the
feigners scored T >65, that is, they did not
employ the unexpected “giving a good image of
oneself” strategy.
Configurations of the validity scales.
The configurations of the validity scales
enhance the robustness for validating or invalidate
the results obtained in the protocol. As for the
detection of feigning, the F-K index, also referred
to as the Gough index, and the “inverted V”
profile are considered to be effective indicators
(Duckworth & Anderson, 1995). The comparison
of the F-K index (M= 37.87; SD= 32.01) with the
average cut-off informed in the literature for
feigning (Rogers, Sewell, Martin, & Vitacco,
2003) (12 in raw sores and T scores >30), not
showed that this index was robust for the detection
of feigning, t(104)=2.52; p<.05. Notwithstanding,
the analysis of cases showed that this configuration
only correctly classified 55.2% of feigners; hence,
it is not a reliable indicator in case classification,
χ2(1)=1.152; ns, given that it did not classify
better than random prediction (50%). As for the
“inverted V” profile (T scores on the L and K <50
and F>80 are indicative of feigning) (Jiménez &
Sánchez, 2003) was only able to accurately classify
25 malingers, that is, 23.81% which implies that
is considerably less effective than random
prediction, χ²(1)= 28.81; p<.001. In short, the
combinations of indexes were not efficient for
forensic procedures designed to detect the feigning
of psychological injury in cases of MVA.
Analysis of the additional validity scales of the
MMPI-2.
The additional validity scales TRIN and
VRIN (T>70; >13 in raw scores) (Hathaway &
McKinley, 1999) were insensitive to the
instructions factor (see Table 5) and absolutely
unproductive for the classification of feigners.
Consequently, both scales lack any value for
the detection of feigning responses concerning
the clinical injuries sustained in a MVA. As for
the Fb Scale a significant increase mediated by
the instructions factor was observed (see Table
5). Moreover, the comparison between the data
for the “feigning instructions” condition,
(M=79.98; SD= 26.14) and the value of the
theoretical cut-off point for feigning (T score
>70) (Hathaway & McKinley, 1999) revealed
that this feigning estimator was statistically
reliable, t(104)=8.05; p<.001. Nevertheless, the
analysis of cases confirms that this feigning
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indicator (55.2% of correct classifications) is as
reliable as random prediction (50%), χ2(1)=1.15;
ns. Moreover, the analysis of cases showed that
the participants who were detected as feigners
by this indicator had also been detected by the
original F Scale.
TABLE 5
Univariate effects in the MMPI-2 additional control scales mediated by the instructions factor.
Within-subjects effects.
Additional control Scales MS F p eta² Mes Msi 1-B
TRIN 224.23 3.21 .076 .030 50.56 48.49 .426
VRIN 3.73 .045 .832 .000 48.98 49.25 .055
Fb Posterior/Back F 50918.57 131.77 .000 .559 48.84 79.98 1
Note: df (1,104). M
si= Mean of standard instructions. Mmi= Mean of malingering instructions.
Overall analysis of feigning detection with the
validity indicators.
The consistency in the evaluation is an essential
cornerstone for judicial judgment making
(Judgement of the Spanish Supreme Court of 8
February 1995, RJ 808; Judgement of the Spanish
Supreme Court of 18 November, RJ 7987) as well
as for the validity of psychological evidence in
court (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington., 1983).
Similarly, for invalidating a protocol as feigning, at
least two of the relevant original validity scales for
feigning (no-answers, F and K Scales) or their
corresponding combinations (F-K and “inverted
V” profile) should classify a protocol as such
(Lachar, 1974; Roig-Fusté, 1993). Consequently,
the accumulative effect of these indexes and their
configurations was analysed. The results, whose
contingencies can be seen in Table 6, underline the
accumulative effectiveness of 57.14%, which is
not better than a random prediction, χ2(1)=2.14;
ns. Thus, 42.85 % (n=45) of feigners were able to
effectively manipulate these controls. The analysis
of these 45 feigners showed that 19 did not fake the
expected psychological injury whereas 26 (24.76%)
simulated the expected psychological injury which
denotes a margin of error greater than statistically
admissible, the criteria of statistical significance
(contrast value of .05), Z(105)=9.29; p<.001.
DISCUSSION
Prior to the interpretation of the results and
arriving at any conclusions, it would be wise to
briefly mention three basic limitations of this
study. First, it would be convenient to underline
that the participants were not undertaking a real-
life task, quite simply, they neither suffered from
injuries sustained in a MVA nor were claiming
compensation for injury. Hence, the implications
and psychological circumstances surrounding
the case were quite different thus the interpretation
of the results cannot be directly extrapolated to
real-life cases without certain reservations
(Konecni & Ebbesen, 1979). Secondly, as our
participants were mock feigners and victims, it
was impossible to determine the incidence of
TABLE 6
Validity indexes and the number of
malingerers detected.
Number of indexes malingerers detected
0 18(17.14%)
1 27(25.71%)
> 2 60(57.14%)
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false positives with the present experimental
design. Thirdly, given that different processes of
victimization does not result in identical
psychological injury (i.e., Bryant & Harvey,
1995; Blanchard & Hickling, 2004; Kessler et
al., 1995), and that the ability to feign varies
from one to another (i.e., Arce, Pampillón, &
Fariña, 2002, Bury & Bagby, 2002), the results
cannot be generalised directly to other forensic
settings that are unrelated to MVAs.
Bearing in mind these limitations concerning
the results, the following conclusions may be
drawn. Firstly, people, regardless of their
knowledge of psychopathology, are capable of
feigning psychological injury on the MMPI both
in terms of primary (PTSD) and secondary
(depression) disorders resulting from a MVA.
This ability to feign may be generalized to other
forensic settings with implications for courts
such as criminal insanity, work place accident
victims, or sexual assault (i.e., Arce et al., 2002;
Bury & Bagby, 2002; Elhai, Gold, Sellers, &
Dorfman, 2001). Secondly, on the whole, the
original MMPI validity scales are sensitive to
feigning. Thirdly, on the basis of the MMPI
validity indicators two strategies for the detection
of feigning have been identified: positive and
negative criteria. Fourthly, positive criteria are
those that predict the possibility of dissimulation.
Two positive criteria available in our study i.e.,
L scores >70 and K scores >65. According to our
findings, the values of the L Scale indicators of
dissimulation were not entirely effective feigners
of psychological injury. Thus, according to this
scale, some feigners are dissimulators though
they can effectively fake psychological injury of
a MVA. As for the scoring criteria K >65, it was
completely insensitive to feigning given that
none of the feigners were detected as a
dissimulator by this index. Consequently, in
real-life evaluations a score K >65 is a very
robust indicator that we are not facing a feigner.
Fifthly, the negative criteria, which are indicative
of possible feigning, were six in total (“no
answers,” L, F, and K Scales, and the
configurations F-K and the “inverted V” profile).
Of these, only one was robust for the classification
of cases: low scores (T score <50) on the K Scale
(78.1% correct classifications). Furthermore, the
probability of non-correct rejections (that is,
failing to identify feigners as feigners) is
significant. Sixth, the accumulative effect of the
different indexes was tested using the consistency
between two or more indicators as a standard for
reliability (Lachar, 1974; Roig-Fusté, 1993),
finding that the consistency in feigning prediction
of psychological injury was only 57.14%.
Seventh, the additional indexes VRIN and TRIN
were entirely ineffective and non-productive for
the classification of cases. As for the Fb Scale
(Back F), it was statistically effective, but not for
the classification of feigners. Moreover, this
index, which was derived from the original F
scale, classified the same cases as this one,
which implies measurement duplicity.
Though the validity indicators of the MMPI
may be effective for the detection of feigning,
these entailed a significant margin of error, and
the lack of consistency in feigning detection
underscores the need for a multimethod approach
in order to improve the performance in predicting
feigning (Arbisi, 2005; Arce et al., 2002; Polusny
& Arbisi, 2006; Rogers, 1997c).
Finally, as for the strategies employed by
potential feigners, the results reveal that the
participants resorted to two strategies (Rogers &
Mitchell, 1991) i.e., “symptoms severity” and
“indiscriminate symptom endorsement”. The
strategy of symptom severity highlights a
common error made by feigners i.e., describing
their clinical state as very serious as can be seen
from the high severity they ascribed to their
mental disorders. Moreover, given the extensive
number of malingering disorders endorsed by
feigners, it appears they adopted the strategy
“the more the symptoms the better”, that is,
indiscriminate symptoms endorsement.
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